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SEEkING PROTEcTION fROM THE LAw? 
ExPLORING cHANGING ARGuMENTS fOR u.S. DOMESTIc 
vIOLENcE ASYLuM cLAIMS AND GENDERED RESISTANcE  
bY cOuRTS
By 
Richael Faithful*
I. INTRODucTION
In July 2009, the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (“DHS”) argued in a supplemental Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) brief that under certain circumstances, female 
domestic violence (“DV”) survivors may have a cognizable asy-
lum claim in the United States.1 The DHS brief breaks nine years 
of executive level silence on the issue,2 as the Obama administra-
tion ignites advocates’ imaginations about the future of domestic, 
gender-based asylum.
The administration’s new position is significant on two 
levels. First, domestic violence has become the miner’s canary 
issue for gender-based asylum. Gender-based claims occupy an 
ambivalent area in United States asylum law but in recent years, 
female genitalia mutilation (“FGM”), also known as female cir-
cumcision,3 has been the basis under which women bring suc-
cessful asylum claims.4 The BIA’s treatment of the DHS brief has 
the potential to clarify the gender question, marking its relevance 
and meaning in asylum law today.
Second, the BIA’s response is a potential turning point 
for women’s issues within international law. The United States, 
like many other countries, is conflicted on the gender question 
because it is still influenced by historical tensions between male-
centered norms and modern challenges to them. Domestic vio-
lence, as a quintessential women’s issue on one hand, exposes 
the human rights law evolution that is beginning to fully embrace 
violence against women as an issue, and on the other hand, 
exposes its shortcomings as an area that still fails to adequately 
protect women from gendered persecution. Thus, a successful 
effort to recognize DV claims may align emerging values with 
ancient practices to further legitimize women’s issues within 
human rights law.
This essay intends to offer context to the executive 
branch’s new position, and to evaluate proposed ideas in order 
to better establish gender-based asylum claims. Part One of this 
essay briefly provides a background for the development of inter-
national human rights law related to women’s issues. Part Two 
observes the ways in which embedded male bias within United 
States common law creates persistent barriers for domestic vio-
lence claims. Part Three evaluates the executive’s position and 
alternative proposals for reform under governing law. Finally, 
Part Four concludes by arguing that at this stage, devising com-
prehensive strategies for systemic reform is the most important 
contribution that human rights scholars can make to strengthen 
future DV and other gender-based claims.
II. fREEDOM fROM GENDERED vIOLENcE AS A  
HuMAN RIGHT
Women’s citizenship within international human rights 
law is a new phenomenon. International human rights law is 
the culmination of evolved shared values and aspirations by the 
world community that “corresponds only partially to the histori-
cal reality: the rights of women and of non-white persons, in fact, 
arose relatively late in history.”5 This area of law is humanizing 
its treatment toward women to meet a “standard of citizenship,”6 
as conditions surrounding women are increasingly recognized 
as inhumane. More recently, feminism and human rights have 
formed a rich dialectical relationship. This relationship relies on 
each field’s strengths to fill in theoretical gaps to develop more 
inclusive and relief-driven principles.7 The result is tangible 
improvements in legal citizenship for some poor women, women 
of color, and women living in the global south.
Refugee law must be viewed within this broader interna-
tional human rights history and legal framework. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the basis of international human 
rights, is often criticized for excluding social and economic 
rights, such as the right to work, right to control one’s posses-
sions, and the right to be free from violence. Women are dispro-
portionately impacted by these fatal exclusions,8 but a multitude 
of conventions and agreements now expressly recognize women’s 
legal citizenship. The most notable international commitment is 
the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women (“CEDAW”).9
CEDAW is generally hailed as a pivotal international law 
effort to enfranchise women. One Latina feminist scholar claims 
that CEDAW “takes a holistic approach towards women from all 
walks of life attaining full personhood by recognizing the impor-
tance not only of civil and political rights but also of social, eco-
nomic, cultural and solidarity rights.”10 She further argues that 
“[t]his treaty, along with other gender specific documents and 
perspectives recently embraced by the global community as well 
as the recognition of the need for gender perspectives in general 
documents (such as the International Criminal Court statute), are 
(can be) the foundation for making women’s equality an acces-
sible reality.”11 Other feminist scholars, however, criticize what 
they view as CEDAW’s practical futility with the consideration 
that “rights only exist to the extent states recognize and enforce 
them.”12 The area of asylum law uniquely feels the absence of 
accountability mechanisms to enforce CEDAW.
United States asylum law is based on the Immigration 
and Nationality Act revision after adoption of the 1951 United 
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Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refu-
gees Convention”) and the corresponding 1967 United Nations 
protocol.13 Gender is not an enumerated asylum ground under 
the Refugees Convention, which includes race, religion, nation-
ality, political opinion or a “particular social group.”14 In 1991, 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (“UNHCR”) attempted to address this omission by issuing 
Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women that explained 
“women refugees who are persecuted on account of their oppo-
sition to social traditions need protection and therefore should 
qualify as members of a [particular social group].”15 Several 
countries, including the United States, issued their own guide-
lines to further clarify the role of gender in refugee cases.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) 
issued Considerations	 for	Asylum	Officers	Adjudicating	Asylum	
Claims	 from	Women	 (“INS Guidelines”) in 1995.16 Domestic 
advocates heralded the INS Guidelines as a “significant step for-
ward for women in asylum law[.]”17 In terms of DV claims, the 
INS Guidelines are helpful because they affirm that “private” 
persecution in which the government is unwilling or unable to 
intervene is a cognizable asylum claim.18 At the same time, how-
ever, the INS Guidelines failed to establish domestic violence 
itself as a form of persecution and instead regarded it merely as 
evidence of past	persecution.19 Most importantly, the INS Guide-
lines do not assume the force of law. 20 This essential issue will 
be discussed more in the final section.
Efforts by international law-making bodies to establish 
violence against women as a cognizable asylum claim within 
its member-states clearly fall short. The United States (“U.S.”) 
rarely grants asylum for gender-based violence against women, 
even though 80% of the world’s 27 million 
refugees are women and children.21 The 
legal authority around domestic violence is 
clear, yet “its operation still depends on the 
political will of those who interpret it.”22 
Simply put, U.S. immigration courts and 
executive officers lack the political will to 
enforce the law.
III. READING bETwEEN THE LINES: cRITIcAL GENDER 
PERSPEcTIvE IN ASYLuM cOMMON LAw AND 
PREcEDENT cASES
Feminist legal scholars have long-argued that DV survi-
vors deserve asylum protection as a “particular social group”23 
(“PSG”). These analyses generate explanatory force behind argu-
ments that violence against women is tolerated within asylum 
law throughout the world.24 Interestingly, however, even though 
gendered violence remains a rare basis on which to grant asylum, 
two new trends have emerged. First, DV claims tied to religious 
or political persecution are increasingly successful. Second, 
“uncivilized” violence against women, specifically FGM, is gain-
ing favor within courts as a basis for asylum. I argue that these 
two patterns do not reflect significant improvement in attitudes 
toward female survivors; rather, these patterns reveal systemic 
male bias within the asylum legal framework in its common law 
and interpretative rationale.
Scholars address male bias within asylum law in both 
a general and a specific context. Generally, scholarship on DV 
asylum describes its legal framework as heavily reliant on male-
centered experiences.25 Specifically, many of these critiques 
appropriately point out that certain persecution-defined harms, 
such as domestic violence, are often regarded as “private” issues 
that are unworthy of foreign intervention.26 Beyond this specific 
observation, male bias also appears within the common law tests 
for defining persecution. These tests premise “rational” presump-
tions about violence on a limited set of realities faced by a minor-
ity of applicants. For this reason DV is an exceedingly difficult 
claim to prove within the governing law.
It is worth noting that gender violence is not synony-
mous with violence against women. Historically, among feminist 
writers, domestic violence had been conceptualized as spousal 
or heterosexual partner violence.27 Contemporary feminist writ-
ers and advocates prefer the term, “intimate-partner violence,” 
to capture abuse within non-legally recognized relationships 
(such as relationships between non-married people or between 
lesbian, gay, or transgender-identified individuals).28 Others pre-
fer “gender-based violence” to broaden this perspective even 
more because gender non-conformity (sometimes perceived as 
homosexuality) and other gender-related human rights abuses 
occur outside the law’s current scope.29 This discussion is framed 
within the context of domestic violence for analytical purposes.30 
Generally speaking, relationship violence, regardless of form, 
remains on the outskirts of the law because male-centered per-
spectives continue to dominate asylum law.31
It is also important to understand DV as a social, politi-
cal, and moral pandemic. The international statistics are stagger-
ing. One-quarter to one-half of all women are abused by intimate 
partners, and 40 to 70% of all female murder victims are killed 
by intimate partners.32 Sadly, U.S. statis-
tics reflect similar trends. A 1995-1996 
survey found that nearly 25% of women, 
and 7.6% of men, were raped or physi-
cally assaulted by an intimate partner in 
their lifetime.33 Intimate partner violence 
constituted 20% of all non-fatal violence 
against women in 2001, and 3% of all non-
fatal violence toward men.34 Almost half 
of all 3.5 million crimes committed against 
family members were spousal abuse between 1998 and 2002.35 
DV exhibits a pattern of violence and oppression that is inherent 
in any reasonable notion of persecution. The international com-
munity’s impression of persecution in the 1950’s, however, does 
not reflect our modern realities, and those seeking to expand the 
definition of DV have faced a decades-long legal challenge that 
has proven more difficult than ever imagined.
Domestic violence does not fit neatly into the current 
refugee legal regime. In order to be eligible for a discretionary 
grant of relief, a petitioner must show a well-founded fear of per-
secution based on a protected status and must meet three criteria: 
1) the pervasiveness of the act in the individual’s home country; 
2) a lack of existing refuge within the individual’s home country; 
and 3) the government’s unwillingness or inability to intervene. 
Two requirements specifically pose challenges for domestic vio-
lence claims: proving persecution (clear probability that one’s 
life or freedom is threatened)36 and demonstrating that such 
persecution is attributed to a statutorily protected status, such as 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or a PSG.37 Many 
DV petitioners argue that they will suffer persecution based on 
Simply	put,	U.S.	immigration	
courts	and	executive	officers		
lack	the	political	will	to		
enforce	the	law.
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their membership in a PSG or based on their political opinion 
against women and girl violence. 38
Ironically, without gender as an enumerated ground, 
PSG DV claims are not viable at all because “defining what con-
stitutes such a group for purposes of the INA remains elusive 
and inconsistent.” 39 The PSG category is sometimes referred to 
as a Refugee Convention drafting “after-
thought,”40 only added on a whim by a 
single delegation wishing to have a miscel-
lany category. One scholar described the 
Refugee Convention’s provisions, which 
he believes mirrors post-World War II era 
politics, as “frozen in time.”41 U.S. immi-
gration judges and the United Nations have 
construed this category to mean selective 
persecution, 42 meaning that a PSG cannot 
be significantly defined by its past or future 
persecution. For instance, the Sixth Circuit 
Court found that young, attractive Albanian 
women who fear being forced into prosti-
tution are not a PSG because they constitute a self-defined or 
“impermissibly circular” (IC) group.43 DV claims are arguably 
most vulnerable on this point because “domestic violence survi-
vors” are interpreted as an “impermissibly circular” social group 
that is defined by its membership. The IC application discussed 
in the next section will address how the three PSG tests pose dis-
tinct barriers for DV claims.
MALE bIAS EMbEDDED wITHIN LEGAL TESTS
There are three PSG tests: immutability, visibility, and 
particularity. Each test contains subtle, insidious male-bias in 
its common law construction that leads to an unnecessarily nar-
row interpretation. The outcome is that legitimate DV claims are 
rejected almost per se because PSG tests are construed narrowly 
and heighten the burden of proof for petitioners.
The first test is the Acosta standard, which establishes 
that a social group must share a common, immutable “ charac-
teristic that either is beyond the power of the individual members 
of the group to change or is so fundamental to their identities 
or consciences that it ought not be required to be changed.”44 
Some courts have slightly expanded this definition to include 
an innate characteristic or shared past experience.45 The Acosta 
standard is favorable to DV claims. For example, a female DV 
survivor who suffers persecution at the hands of a male lover 
who hurts her because of his belief that women are subordinate 
to men, and because he has the physical ability to do so, may eas-
ily meet the Acosta standard on account of her identity as female 
or her history of abuse.46 Overall, the flexibility around the 
Acosta standard accommodates DV claims. It is the other two 
requirements—visibility and particularity—that are the most dif-
ficult to meet.
Social visibility is the second PSG test. This test is par-
ticularly context-dependent47 since petitioners must provide evi-
dence that they are at greater risk due to their membership in an 
identifiable PSG.48 This test clearly excludes less visible forms 
of persecution like DV or rape. Other scholars have examined 
the exclusion of privatized violence in detail, and this will be 
addressed briefly later in the essay. More significant, however, 
is that this test presents a pernicious epistemological dilemma 
when considered with the non-PSG standards. As noted before, 
there are three criteria for the persecution threshold, including a 
“pervasive” standard and “inability to escape” standard. DV sur-
vivors who may experience “private” violence that is nonetheless 
pervasive, normalized, or honored, face a disadvantage to prove 
that their persecution is visible when it is 
systemically ignored, rationalized, or ritual-
ized. Thus, the “substantial evidence” bar49 
is heightened for DV survivors who must 
show that DV has a high	 occurrence	 rate	
and	is	visible in their home country. Such a 
proposition is counter-intuitive because any 
“rational” state government would address 
widely known harms against its citizens, 
but this presumption is inaccurate when 
applied to DV and other gendered violence. 
The internal tensions built into the visibil-
ity test and other standards starkly contrast 
with the realities of violence faced by a 
large number of women. Further, this dilemma demonstrates a 
narrow common law construction that favors male-experienced 
persecution.
The final PSG test is “particularity” which requires a 
social group to be discerned “in a manner sufficiently distinct 
that the group would be recognized, in the society in question, as 
a discrete class of persons.”50 The “particularity” test is intended 
to create a benchmark for objectively determining group mem-
bership.51 Yet its interpretation, like the visibility test, reveals 
implicit male bias. An opinion from the Third Circuit, Fatin	v.	
Immigration	&	Naturalization	Service,52 characterizes this bias, 
stating:
“Limited in this way, the ‘particular social 
group’ identified by the petitioner may well sat-
isfy the BIA’s definition of that concept, for if a 
woman’s opposition to the Iranian laws in ques-
tion is so profound that she would choose to 
suffer the severe consequences of noncompli-
ance, her beliefs may well be characterized as 
‘so fundamental to [her] identity or conscience 
that [they] ought not be required to be changed’ 
(internal citation omitted). The petitioner’s 
difficulty, however, is that the administrative 
record does not establish that she is a member 
of this tightly defined group, for there is no evi-
dence in that record showing that her opposi-
tion to the Iranian laws at issue is of the depth 
and importance required.”53
The Circuit Court rejected Fatin’s petition despite ample 
evidence that she was doubly at risk as a female member of a 
politically targeted family in Iran.54 Moreover, the Court relied 
on an admittedly sparse record to conclude that a reasonable 
fact-finder could not find that the petitioner would face a threat 
amounting to persecution “simply” because she is a woman.55 
The opinion ignored her family’s political status when relevant, 
and her status as a politically-vulnerable woman when important 
to determine that she was at risk for neither reason. This case 
demonstrates that the visibility and particularly tests interlock to 
DV	survivors	who	may	
experience	“private”	violence	
that	is	nonetheless	pervasive,	
normalized,	or	honored,	face	
a	disadvantage	to	prove	that	
their	persecution	is	visible	
when	it	is	systemically	ignored,	
rationalized,	or	ritualized.
Fall 2009	 21
reinforce male bias by privileging male-experienced persecution 
over other types of meritorious persecution.
The three “particular social group” tests create numerous 
barriers for proving persecution outside traditional male norms. 
Perhaps worse than rejecting legitimate 
DV claims vis-à-vis PSG tests, the courts 
have adopted the facially-neutral rule of 
“impermissibly circular,” which adversely 
impacts gender-based claims. Worse still, 
courts inconsistently apply the rule based 
on culturally-loaded, paternalistic beliefs 
about “deserving exceptions.”
THE “IMPERMISSIbLY cIRcuLAR” ARGuMENT AND ITS 
OPPORTuNISTIc RATIONALITY
The “impermissibly circular” (“IC”) rule derives from 
the rationale that a PSG must exist independently of the perse-
cution suffered by the applicant for asylum.56 In other words, a 
PSG must exist before the alleged persecution to avoid defining a 
group within its own “contours.”57 Past persecution, under some 
circumstances, may demonstrate a well-founded fear of future 
persecution; it cannot, however, constitute the substantive claim 
for protection.58 In some cases, previously discussed PSG tests 
are interwoven together to form an IC analysis. For instance, 
at-risk youth within a certain country are unlikely to meet the 
persecution threshold because their membership is based on a 
self-defining, mutable characteristic—age.59 IC, therefore, refers 
to the ways by which a PSG is narrowed in the common law to 
necessarily exclude claims.60 Otherwise, supporters fear that the 
law would “sanction an illogical, circular ‘nexus’ construct, i.e., 
individuals are targeted for persecution because they belong to 
a group of individuals who are targeted for persecution.”61 This 
fear seems to contradict the fundamental purposes for asylum to 
provide refuge to individuals who are persecuted for particularly 
inequitable reasons.
Many gender-based claims, especially DV claims, are 
dismissed for being “impermissibly circular.”62 U.S. courts con-
sistently apply the IC rule, despite international consensus urg-
ing judges to include women as a PSG when appropriate.63 Not 
only is it peculiar that federal courts apply a non-discrimination 
human rights treaty to exclude legitimate claims by women,64 but 
it is even more unsettling when the U.S. is one of the four coun-
tries (out of 41) with a domestic policy that recognizes “women” 
as a PSG.65 If arguably U.S. courts have become more gender-
sensitive in response to the 1995 INS Guidelines, courts still 
embrace IC derivatives to deny DV claims, and to say that bat-
tered women are too large of a social group 
for the purposes of statutory construction.66 
Recent cases continue to show a reluctance 
to recognize freedom from gendered vio-
lence as a civil or political human right.
While there are indications that 
gender-based claims are receiving more 
serious treatment, adjudicators continue 
to perpetuate male bias and, in certain 
instances, substitute cultural bias for gen-
der bias. It appears that the classic “worthy refugee” dilemma is 
only further strained with gender, race, and cultural complexities. 
Judges choose to find sympathetic exceptions among cases rather 
than choosing to embrace gender-based persecution into the law. 
This approach inevitably undermines future domestic violence 
claims. There are three primary areas of analysis ripe for incon-
sistent, biased discretion, which are appro-
priate to call “opportunistic rationality”: 
private/public persecution, state/non-gov-
ernmental actors, and violent experiences. 
Opportunistic rationality reinforces that 
“reason” goes as far as the logician in gen-
der-based asylum cases.
The first area of analysis is the 
distinction between “private” and “public” 
persecution. Domestic violence is essen-
tially a misnomer as violence against partners takes place in both 
private and public view. Its description relates more to an anti-
quated conception of the relationship between perpetrator and 
survivor. Nevertheless, “[t]raditional human rights law (and vir-
tually all other discourses except feminism) has separated out 
acts that occur in the public sector from those that transpire in 
the private sphere.”67 As a result, courts have rejected otherwise 
legitimate asylum claims on the basis that there is no justifica-
tion for state intervention. Over time, “private act” justifications 
have become less accepted, but remarkably it continues to have 
a menacing presence in U.S. asylum domestic violence claims, 
exemplified by a feminist BIA favorite: The	Matter	of	R-A-.
The	Matter	 of	 R-A-68 is an archetypal example of the 
enduring belief that domestic violence is essentially a private 
matter. In this case, Rodi Alvardo, a native Guatemalan, sought 
refugee status after suffering years of violent physical, sexual, 
and emotional abuse from her husband, which included: her dis-
located jaw for a late period, spinal injuries from a kicking attack 
after refusing an abortion and near physical disability when a 
thrown machete barely missed her fingers.69 Alvardo demon-
strated that domestic violence in Guatemala remains prevalent70 
and that few if any legal organizations could have helped her.71 
She was successful in the lower immigration court in arguing that 
her political opinion, opposing male domination, culminated in 
her well-founded fear of persecution, with which the BIA par-
tially agreed.72 The BIA ruled that the case turned on whether 
Alvardo’s husband had knowledge of her views and abused her 
but	for her views.73 In its determination, the BIA refused to apply 
the imputed political doctrine,74 a device that allows the court 
to affirmatively impute a political opinion through evidentiary 
inferences, such as acts of resistance.75 The imputed political 
doctrine is recommended by the INS Guidelines for cases such 
as this one. Instead, almost in defiance, the BIA dismissed INS 
Guidelines as “not controlling on us”76 and found that “it is diffi-
cult to conclude on the actual record before 
us that there is any ‘opinion’ the respondent 
could have held, or convinced her husband 
she held, that would have prevented the 
abuse she experienced.”77
The BIA’s opinion in The	 Mat-
ter	of	R-A- rendered the petitioner’s belief 
that she deserves to live free from domes-
tic violence as an apolitical viewpoint. In 
other words, although governing law does 
not require political opinions to be articulated in a certain way 
or venue,78 the court was unwilling to recognize her claim as 
courts	inconsistently	apply		
the	rule	based	on	culturally-
loaded,	paternalistic	beliefs	
about	“deserving	exceptions.
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gender,	race,	and	cultural	
complexities.
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worthy of intervention because it was not an effective	opinion. 
The de-politicization of Alvardo’s views reinforces the belief that 
domestic violence is not a public matter—it is simply another 
unfortunate private situation over which the state has no power.
The second area of analysis relates to non-state per-
secutors. DV claims reveal the historic reluctance of judges to 
view non-governmental actors as potential 
persecutors in the “safe haven” standard 
(among the three persecution criteria). 
Opponents to broadening the standard 
maintain a misguided belief that “constru-
ing private acts of violence to be qualify-
ing governmental persecution, by virtue 
of inadequacy of protection, would obvi-
ate, perhaps entirely, the ‘on account of ’ 
requirement of the statute.”79 This is a slip-
pery-slope argument that posits that updat-
ing the standard to reflect present-day 
realities will somehow validate any asylum claim. On the con-
trary, broadening the standard does not wash away state sover-
eignty; instead, it more accurately captures the complex violence 
patterns that we see today. There is a real distinction between 
inadequate state protection and unwillingness from the state to 
protect a class. Fortunately, the current U.S. jurisprudential trend 
is to acknowledge negative governmental action as rising to the 
standard. It remains to be seen whether this trend will widely 
apply to gender-based cases, in which petitioners usually do not 
have any practical protection at home. Equally worrisome, the 
modern “safe haven” standard is subject to high levels of discre-
tion without codification. One example is Canada, which treats 
its gender guidelines more seriously, arguing that pain and suf-
fering may result from willful government acquiescence.80 The 
future of the modern “safe haven” standard will appreciably 
depend on the outcomes of current DV cases.
The final “opportunistic ratio-
nality” area of analysis is seen in violent 
experiences for which courts have cre-
ated exceptions. Over the last decade, only 
one area of gender-based asylum claims 
has seen almost universal success: FGM 
cases.81 These cases typify the “worthy ref-
ugee” dilemma where adjudicators choose 
to recognize the brutality of gender-related 
violence in one context while choosing to 
rationalize it in another. Half of the federal 
circuit courts and the BIA have found FGM 
as an act of persecution rising to the level of 
asylum protection during the last several years. Successful FGM 
cases will expose domestic violence claims to increased biased 
scrutiny at best.
FGM is not qualitatively distinct from DV but cultural 
bigotry and racism color the issues differently in some judges’ 
eyes. Courts’ treatment of domestic violence in relation to FGM 
exposes Western feminists’ failure to incorporate strong racial and 
cultural analysis into its advocacy surrounding the issue. Promi-
nent issue scholar Pamela Goldberg’s three-case comparison in 
the Second Circuit found race to be a key distinction among the 
gender-based asylum claims that she studied.82 Notably, in one 
case she describes that a black petitioner’s “exotic ‘otherness’” 
did not reflect negatively against her as much as it supported her 
claim against her black persecutors.83 The problem with charac-
terizing FGM cases as exceptionally violent is that it obscures 
urgency around violent experiences, such as domestic violence, 
that are more familiar to U.S. judges. “Uncivilized” violence 
against women and girls “over there” does not force courts to 
confront gender-based violence as a widespread, complex phe-
nomenon. In actuality, it exacerbates cul-
tural and racial stereotypes in a way that 
isolates and distances them from the issue. 
Inconsistent application of the law creates 
the potential for a racialized, tiered system 
by which violence is evaluated in the asy-
lum law in a way that ultimately does not 
serve human rights law.
Opportunistic rationality is 
defined by false notions about the nature 
of violence, and it is reinforced by legal 
rationalizations about distinctions among 
these false notions. In addition to the PSG test interpretations, 
male bias plays a more subtle role in decision-making through 
arbitrary application that is ironically justified by North Ameri-
can feminist paradigms.
Iv. NEw fORMuLATIONS, NEw PROSPEcTS?
The DHS supplemental brief submitted to the BIA 
on behalf of a domestic violence asylum-seeker seems to be a 
positive outcome for gender-based asylum cases. The brief pres-
ents “alternative particular social group formulations” to the 
respondent’s claim: “Mexican women in an abusive domestic 
relationship who are unable to leave.”84 DHS concedes that the 
respondent’s argument fails under governing legal principles 
because the “central common characteristic” is circular.85 In 
addition to the alternative formulations, the 
brief proposes that if either of its formu-
lations meets the criteria for a cognizable 
claim, then remand is an appropriate mech-
anism to consider where “significant legal 
developments intervene.”86 The last caveat 
outlined by the brief is that some, but not 
all, domestic violence survivors are eligible 
for asylum. However, like any other asylum 
claim, every applicable requirement must 
be satisfied for asylum to be granted.87
There are discernable signs of 
broader advocacy in the brief. In its gen-
eral requirement discussion, the brief stated that the applicant 
may satisfy the safe haven standard by showing that government 
acquiescence is contributing to the respondent’s persecution.88 
This position reinforces the authority of the INS Guidelines 
despite higher courts’ attempts to dismiss their importance. 
Moreover, before laying out the formulations, the brief opined 
“especially given the uneven development of the standards gov-
erning cases like this one, it is important to articulate how a social 
group in such cases might be defined.”89 Both of these statements 
are restrained, yet are striking examples that likely foreshadow 
the new administration’s more liberal treatment of gender-based 
asylum cases.
“Uncivilized”	violence	against	
women	and	girls	“over	there”	
does	not	force	courts	to		
confront	gender-based		
violence	as	a	widespread,	
complex	phenomenon.
Opportunistic	rationality	
is	defined	by	false	notions	
about	the	nature	of	violence,	
and	it	is	reinforced	by	legal	
rationalizations	about	
distinctions	among	these		
false	notions.
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DHS articulates its formulations as “Mexican women 
in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” or “Mexican 
women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions 
within a domestic relationship.”90 DHS argues that a PSG claim 
is “best defined in light of the evidence about how the respon-
dent’s abuser and her society perceive her role within the domes-
tic relationship.”91 The brief goes on to detail the evidence on 
record that supports the formulation, including her testimony that 
her husband “used to tell her that he could do anything he wanted 
to her because she belonged to him,” and it suggests that further 
fact-finding may substantiate that “social expectations in Mexico 
do little to disabuse [him] of his views in this regard.”92 These 
formulations, DHS argues, satisfy the immutability, visibility, 
and particularity requirements, in which “complex and subtle” 
fact-finding may be required, and existing statutory definitions 
may be evoked, to reasonably interpret the claims.93
Interestingly, the DHS formulations are identical to 
some feminist scholars’ proposals over the last decade to trans-
form DV into a cognizable asylum. The primary, though not 
exclusive, project by feminists during this time has been to find 
ways to narrow domestic violence claims so that they better fit 
into the three PSG factor tests. Feminists’ proposals can be gen-
erally categorized into three groups: 1) traditional approach: re-
formulating arguments to fit within existing legal interpretations; 
2) feminist approach: arguing that existing interpretations are 
inaccurate or biased against legitimate claims, thus urging new 
rule construction and 3) reform approach: advocating for inter-
national and domestic statutory revisions to more clearly include 
“gender” into refugee law. DHS adopted a traditional approach 
that attempts to narrow the “domestic violence survivor” class 
by combining several elements: geography, political opinion, and 
case-specific facts.
The DHS formulations will test scholars’ proposals that 
were argued to meet judicial scrutiny when initially proposed—
all other factors remaining consistent. One proposal, written by 
Patricia Seith in 1997, argues that domestic violence is analo-
gous to FGM because both practices attempt to “control [ ] 
women’s sexuality,”94 and that “[w]omen living in a particular 
country who are subject to domestic violence, are unable to get 
government protection, and oppose the practice” meet the BIA 
requirements under the seminal decision in Kasigna.95 Another 
prominent scholar on domestic violence 
asylum, Laura Adams, made an argument 
for a doctrinal re-orientation that takes 
two views related to government acqui-
escence. One view is similar to the DHS 
formulation suggesting that a DV claim 
itself may implicate a foreign govern-
ment’s failure to protect its citizen from 
persecution.96 Adams takes the position that shifting the focus 
from the individual batterer to the state’s relationship to the harm 
is the necessary ingredient for a successful DV claim.97 It will be 
interesting to see whether the BIA embraces any of these aspects, 
as both scholars introduced these ideas at least five years ago.
The fundamental belief that guides the traditional 
approach is that the current legal PSG construction is based on 
an honest, intellectual disagreement about proper interpretation. 
The consistent denial of DV claims is not a legal issue—it is a 
political one. Many immigration judges may have a good faith 
belief that DV survivors simply do not meet the existing statu-
tory requirements. However, it is clear that there are systemic 
impediments that influence the confines within which judges are 
able to interpret important legal considerations like statutory 
intent, case-specific facts, and policy issues. There is not much 
optimism for the successful outcome of the DV survivor in this 
particular case, considering the case law trend against DV claims 
and the absence of any significant changes to PSG construction, 
but there is optimism that the DHS brief will create opportunities 
for institutional change on a case-advocacy level.
Ultimately, institutional change is the best assurance 
that DV claims will be fairly adjudicated. There are a variety of 
ways to affect institutional change, even through notoriously con-
servative institutions, such as immigration courts. Attorneys who 
challenge prevailing norms and assumptions in asylum advocacy 
play an important role. Theorists, especially feminist scholars, 
have fulfilled a vital need by forming the basis by which some 
advocates have advanced alternative frames. Policy advocates 
(many of whom fall into the latter categories as well) also target 
the underpinnings that limit future progress for DV claims. Each 
approach, in its persistence and originality, promises that gender-
based asylum claims, in time, will be treated more seriously by 
courts.
v. cONcLuSION
I suggest that scholars concerned about gender-based 
asylum may want to shift their focus from re-thinking legitimate 
arguments about why gendered violence is deserving of asylum 
protection, to discussing systemic changes that can more directly 
affect decision-making. I believe in particular that strengthening 
the INS Guidelines can prove to be enormously beneficial. At 
least one persuasive feminist scholar credits the INS Guidelines 
with successful rape and FGM claims, in which the guidance 
established “a valuable legal framework for asylum claims based 
on domestic violence.”98
Since this assessment was over a decade ago, there are 
questions yet to be re-visited about the INS Guidelines. Should 
they be codified or at least be required reading for judges? If 
they remain nonbinding, is there addi-
tional authority that can make them even 
more persuasive? Based on its success, 
can gender-based violence be considered 
an independent basis (within PSG) upon 
which future persecution will be deter-
mined? With vast opportunity in a human 
rights era, thinkers can move away from 
defending its values to implementing its force.
The political climate toward human rights is ideal for 
engineering fine-tuned legal and policy reform strategies. It is a 
matter of catching up U.S. asylum law with its international com-
mitments which is by no means easy, but it is possible given the 
strong framework outlined by scholars and advocates alike. DV 
survivors deserve asylum protection, as do other gender-based 
violence survivors. Human rights advocates’ chief test is to make 
this area a priority.
The	consistent	denial	of	DV	
claims	is	not	a	legal	issue—it	is	
a	political	one.
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